by Satish Sekar © Satish Sekar (March 23rd 2012)
Inconvenient Evidence
The case of the Catford Three (Colin Lattimore, Ronald Leighton and Ahmet Salih) is now acknowledged as of Britain’s pivotal miscarriages of justice – one that changed the criminal justice system. Their alibis – Lattimoreʼs was particularly strong – were treated as little more than an inconvenience to be overcome and this appears to explain the forensic pathologist Professor James Cameronʼs sudden change of opinion regarding the time of death.
Outrageously, Cameron waited until the trial was under-way to inform the defence during his evidence that he had changed his mind. Lattimoreʼs lawyers had prepared their defence of alibi on what they had been informed was the time of death that the police and prosecution were relying on. It was all they could do.
Ambush
They had no time to prepare for this change in the prosecution case or even get expert opinion to counter it. They were ambushed by Cameronʼs shifting of the goalposts at trial. It was outrageous and the judge should not have allowed it and nor should the Court of Appeal. Twenty years later the Court of Appeal famously said that it does not allow convictions secured by ambush in the shameful case of Judith Ward.
In its way this was worse as it was not even concealed – it was brazen. The court actually witnessed the ambush in progress and not only tolerated it, but rewarded it with the prize the prosecution sought. After an 18 day trial in November 1972 Lattimore was convicted of manslaughter due to diminished responsibility and Leighton of murder – Salih of the offences he confessed to. Lattimore and Leighton were convicted of the other offences as well.
Outrageous
In November 1972 the three youngsters began their sentences. There was no indication that this would become one of the most important and notorious miscarriages of justice in British history – one that would command two major enquiries and usher in pivotal changes in the law, but there should have been. Cameronʼs shifting of the goalposts on the time of death was outrageous. It destroyed the alibi work the defence had conducted.
It was obvious that Cameron had not changed his mind by such a considerable amount of time when he gave evidence, so when had he come to that conclusion and why? There was another obvious problem with the previous time of death – the fire evidence. If the original time of death was correct it meant that the murderers had stayed around for almost three hours and then set the fire. Why would anyone do that?
Fair Trial?
Changing the time of death neatly avoided that question and avoided the obvious conclusion – the fire had nothing to do with the murder of Maxwell Confait whatsoever. Cameronʼs conduct had rendered a fair trial impossible. The trial should have been stopped immediately and the issue resolved before any retrial occurred. It did not. The fact that this was allowed to happen to children – treated as adults by the law – makes it even more unconscionable.
The Judgeʼs Rules were amended on the treatment of child suspects and on the vulnerable – then termed ʻeducationally sub-normalʼ, but nothing was done about Cameron’s late change of opinion. The Police And Criminal Evidence Act was a direct response to this case and the Prosecution of Offences Act facilitated the establishing of the Crown Prosecution Service as a result of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedures as well.
Shamefully, nothing was done to prevent expert prosecution witnesses ambushing children or even adults at trial. Lord Justice James, delivered the decision of the Court of Appeal in July 1973. It proved to be yet another wretched judgement betraying the arrogance and complacency of a system that believed itself infallible.
“There was no misdirection in the summing-up to the jury and no representation of facts which can be relied upon as justifying the grant of leave to appeal”, said James, regarding Mr Justice Chapmanʼs summing up, but before long it would emerge that there were certainly facts that could justify not only granting leave to appeal, but quashing the convictions which had been secured by contemptible means.